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Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories 
 
Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, Bruno Coppieters,  
Tamara Kovziridze, Michael Emerson and Michel Huysseune 
 
This chapter explores the potential of the EU to bring about conflict 
settlement and conflict resolution in the divided states on its periphery 
through its multi-level framework and capacity for foreign policy action. A 
third level of governance provides new institutional options for conflict 
settlement and creates new incentives that may lead to a redefinition of the 
interests and identities of the parties involved in a secessionist conflict. 
Europeanization is defined as a process which is activated and encouraged by 
European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the final 
outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties 
involved in it into European structures. The Europeanization mechanisms of 
conditionality and socialization aimed at conflict settlement may have 
unintended effects which can undermine the objective of conflict resolution.  
 
This chapter introduces a set of concepts and theories to frame our analysis of ethno-
secessionist conflicts, with a special emphasis on the possibilities for conflict 
settlement and conflict resolution within a multi-level framework. For this purpose we 
use ideas from research on comparative federalism, conflict and peace studies, 
normative studies on war and secession, and literature on Europeanization.  
The concept of Europeanization encompasses both inter- and intra-state 
processes. And indeed we do need to be attentive to the wider geopolitical setting of 
the four cases of conflict in divided states analysed in this research. In these 
secessionist crises, external powers have been – and some still are – supporting one 
party against the other. All the conflicts on the European periphery thus arise along a 
geopolitical fault line as well as a local one. Where hard-line positions are protected 
by an external power, this involvement weakens the incentive to the local parties to 
negotiate a compromise. However, it can also happen that the external power(s) will 
intervene – with intensive mediation or even force – to impose an alternative solution 
to secession. This may take the shape of a new constitution with some form of multi-
tier governance and a power-sharing arrangement between the ethnic communities, 
with guarantees supplied by the external power(s), and – if needed – various 
arrangements for refugees and post-conflict rehabilitation.  
If the external powers are unable or unwilling to organize a powerful impetus 
to change the status quo, either by coordinating their mediation efforts or by agreeing 
on a single leading mediator, the de facto secession normally becomes more 
entrenched. Where there is international competition, the opposing parties gravitate 
into the economic, security and political sphere of their protecting power. This leads 
to a new equilibrium which stretches indefinitely into the future.  
Where attempts at a settlement are successful, conflict transformation may 
take place, possibly leading to conflict resolution. The root causes of the conflict then 
have to be transformed, with new political structures providing a fresh set of 
incentives and expectations, leading to a redefinition of the interests and identities of 
the parties.  
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This chapter explores how European Union structures can provide for such a 
process of conflict settlement leading to conflict transformation and resolution. In the 
following sections we first focus on the institutional possibilities for conflict 
settlement. We begin by highlighting some consequences of ‘traditional’ two-tier 
federal solutions for conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and the potential 
benefits of three-tier solutions. Secondly, we analyse Europeanization processes and 
mechanisms as potential methods of conflict settlement and conflict resolution. 
Thirdly, we examine the wide range of problems involved in the application of 
Europeanization mechanisms. Fourthly, the role played by external players (such as 
Russia and the United States) and by framework organizations in the Europeanization 
of conflict settlement and during post-accord dynamics within a European framework 
are taken into account.  
 
1.1 Two-tier and three-tier federal solutions 
 
The international community of states does not see any of the present secessionist 
entities in Europe as having sufficient justification for being recognized. In these 
cases, independence is not perceived as a remedy against extreme forms of injustice 
such as the illegal occupation of a country, colonialism or the threat of genocide. Even 
if it is often not denied that there have been cases of injustice in the period preceding 
secession, they are not regarded as justifying independence. The international 
community supports alternatives to secession that can remedy such injustices and 
prevent them in the future. Multi-tiered forms of government, in which power is 
shared by the various levels and where every level of authority exercises a certain 
form of self-government following a federal model, is one of them. This may be 
combined with other forms of power-sharing between various national communities, 
or with minority rights.  
Federal arrangements consist of a large variety of state structures that aim to strike 
the right balance between political communities’ need for unity and their need for 
diversity. In all federal structures the different levels of authority have law-making 
and executive prerogatives. Although federative solutions have many variants, in the 
following we highlight four main types – federations, confederations, associated states 
(federacies) and freely associated states.1  
A ‘federation’ is a single sovereign state in international law, where sovereignty is 
shared at the domestic level through a division of competences between a federal 
government and at least two federated units, both levels having a set of state 
institutions, including a legislature and an executive. The federated entities have 
considerable powers and fiscal resources. Powers are distributed between the two 
orders on a constitutionally entrenched basis. This means that none of the levels of 
governance can change these constitutional features unilaterally. Each level of 
governance derives its rights and competences directly from the constitution, and in 
this sense no level of authority is subordinated to the other. Changes in the 
constitution generally require direct or indirect participation by both levels of 
government. In rare cases, the constitution may provide rules that regulate the right to 
secession. 
                                               
1 On various types of federal structure see Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Preston King, Federalism and Federation 
(London: Croom Helm, 1982); Bruno Coppieters, Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 6-8.  
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Some federations have been established to give national minorities an 
institutionalized position within a state, or even to go beyond the codification of 
minority status and follow the principle of national self-determination for all nations 
in a multi-national state. The establishment of such so-called ‘ethno-federations’ is 
facilitated when the various nations are concentrated in particular territories. Ethno-
federalism poses particular problems, however, as regards the status of the territorial 
entities. Not all nations claim the same rights and powers or have the same leverage 
for achieving their objectives. A solution sometimes adopted is that of asymmetrical 
federations, in which one or more federated states enjoy a wider range of powers than 
the other entities.  
Parties favouring secession tend to suspect federations of not being in their 
interests. If they are in a minority position, they are concerned that federal systems 
will not be able to prevent the majority from outvoting them on decisions that are 
crucial to them. Opponents of secession too may worry that federations will not serve 
their interests. They may perceive federal structures as a stepping-stone towards the 
future independence of the federated entities, or as an instrument enabling outside 
powers to intervene in their internal affairs. They may claim that the very capacity for 
self-government within an ethno-federal system becomes an asset and argument for 
independence – as it was the case in the dissolution of the Soviet and Yugoslav 
federal systems – or an instrument to create alliances with outside powers. 
There is, however, no empirical evidence about ethno-federations generally that 
would make it possible to confirm the statement that they are doomed to a violent 
break-up or dissolution. Their record is mixed in this respect. It is certainly true that 
the federal experiences of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia confirm that particular 
forms of ethno-federations are doomed to fail. But this is largely a question of 
constitutional design, and does not reflect a tendency to dissolve on the part of ethno-
federations generally.  
A ‘confederation’ sees two or more states join together for strictly limited 
purposes, for example for foreign affairs and defence, or economic policies.2 
Constitutions of confederal states take the form of a pact or treaty between sovereign 
member states, which does not deprive them of their sovereign statehood in 
international law. Rather than a unified state, a confederation should be termed a 
‘union of states’, with a central government having minimal powers for joint decision-
making. The union is represented by some form of assembly, whose members are not 
directly elected by the people but are appointed and instructed by the constituting 
member-states. They retain veto rights in the confederation’s decision- and policy-
making, particularly on fundamental policy issues.  
Confederations tend to be one of the preferred federal models of seceding parties, 
as they allow their sovereignty to be preserved, and even internationally recognized. 
They generally give states the right to withdraw from the union, as well as the 
                                               
2 The concept of confederation has a more important place in political science literature than in 
contemporary reality. In the history of confederations it is conspicuous that the most eminent examples 
are all cases in which confederal episodes ultimately gave way to more integrated federations or unitary 
states. The four classic cases were the Swiss Confederation, from late medieval times until 1798 and 
again from 1815 to 1848, the United Provinces of the Netherlands from 1579 to 1795, the German 
Bund from 1815 to 1866 and the United States Confederation from 1781 to 1789. Thus none of these 
confederations survived the third quarter of the nineteenth century, an international context where 
centralized statehood became a question of survival. See Xiaokun Song, “Confederalism – A Review 
of Recent Literature”, in B. Coppieters, D. Darchiashvili and N. Akaba (eds), Federal Practice – 
Exploring Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia (Brussels: VUB Press, 2000), pp. 181-193, 
http://poli.vub.ac.be 
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international guarantees implied in the institution of sovereignty. For the same 
reasons, parties keen to preserve the unity of the state tend to be hostile towards 
confederations. 
The transformation of a former federation or unified state into a confederation 
tends to be unappealing to an international community seeking to limit the 
proliferation of micro-states, as a confederation leaves the door open to secession. 
The formation of confederal-type structures out of several pre-existing states, on the 
other hand, encounters no such objections. The European Union is a unique 
supranational structure with a blend of federal, confederal and intergovernmental 
elements in its emerging constitution. As a model of integration, it is equally 
attractive to those who are striving to create new independent states and to those who 
wish to preserve their state’s territorial integrity.  
For some ethno-secessionist conflicts, attempts have been made to find a workable 
compromise between a federation and a confederation under the name of ‘common 
state’. While the term has no generally accepted scientific definition, it has come to be 
used in connection with the search for solutions for the secessionist conflicts of the 
Caucasus, Cyprus and the Balkans. Common state proposals are generally based on 
the idea of creating a state structure with a single personality under international law, 
as is the case in federations, but with a level of domestic institutional integration that 
is no higher than in confederations. In such structures the powers of the federated 
level are far more extensive than those of the federal level (as in a ‘thin’ federation). 
Moreover, they follow a ‘confederal’ logic in their decision-making procedures, with 
extensive veto powers for the federated entities. Some key policy issues of the 
common state are not decided by the federal government but are tackled in common, 
and often outside the formal federal structures, by the governments of the federated 
entities. The federal level functions to a large degree as a coordination mechanism for 
policy issues that need to be prepared for international negotiations, rather than as a 
powerful tier of governance. This characteristic feature is typical of a confederation.  
The idea of a common state with a single international personality satisfies the 
wish of the international community to limit the multiplication of micro-states and to 
protect the principle of territorial integrity. It does not create a powerful federal 
structure for resolving ethno-national conflicts. Critics of this kind of system argue 
that the absence of sufficient ‘federal’ powers makes the common state vulnerable to 
disintegration or ungovernability.  
A federacy, or associated state, is a political arrangement where a smaller unit is 
linked to a larger unit in such a way that it retains a degree of self-government 
without, however, having any significant political role – or even necessarily having 
political representatives in the government of the large unit.3 Some of its powers are 
beyond the authority of the centre. The two units have to come to a mutual agreement 
in order to dissolve their bonds. Puerto Rico’s relations with the US may be used as 
an example here. Other examples include the Faroe Islands (with Denmark) and the 
Channel Islands (with the United Kingdom). The Faroe Islands are a self-governing 
part of Denmark, which is responsible for their external relations and security. They 
have two members in the Danish parliament, but are excluded from the customs area 
and general jurisdiction of the EU. Instead they have a separate trade agreement with 
the European Union. The Channel Islands (principally Jersey and Guernsey) are 
British dependencies, but they have no members in the UK parliament.  
                                               
3 See Watts, op. cit., p. 8 and Bruno Coppieters, Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus, op. cit., p. 8. 
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A freely associated state’s relations with a larger state – such as those between the 
Marshall Islands and the US – are based on international law. The Marshall Islands 
are internationally sovereign and have joined the United Nations. They delegate their 
powers in defence matters to the United States, in exchange for substantial financial 
support. The creation of a freely associated state is often preferred by the seceding 
party as it entails international recognition of its statehood.4  
Two-tier models offer some elements for a solution to ethnic conflicts. But there 
are also federal solutions that include a third level of governance, the main example 
being federations in the EU, where the participation of federated states (first level of 
governance) in federal institutions (second level of governance) is extended through 
EU institutions to European affairs (third level of governance). Other examples of 
such a third tier are regional organizations like the Balkan Stability Pact. The major 
external powers may act through these multilateral organizations to exert their 
influence on other states, thus actively shaping this third level of governance.  
The present study analyses to what extent a third level of governance, particularly 
within the EU framework, may increase the number of options available in the search 
for a settlement. It defends the thesis that a third level of governance may create new 
incentives and expectations in a settlement process, and may even lead to a 
redefinition of the interests and identities of the parties involved in a secessionist 
conflict. This is particularly the case when the federated entities can be integrated into 
the third level of governance. Secessionist conflicts, which lie at the intersection of 
domestic and international politics, can be more easily resolved if the principle of 
national self-determination is not confined to domestic affairs. Contrary to strongly 
entrenched views, federations do not necessarily limit the implementation of this 
principle to internal self-determination, but may extend it to external self-
determination, primarily through the right to external representation and through 
treaty-making power. As in the Belgian model of a multi-national federation, this 
possibility is greatly increased through the inclusion of federated entities in three-tier 
structures. The objective here is to develop a more precise and nuanced definition of 
possible schemes within a European framework, illustrating the wider range of 
variables that may influence the process of negotiating sustainable solutions when a 
third tier of authority is introduced.  
 
1.2 Europeanization as a method of conflict settlement and conflict resolution 
 
In the section that follows we focus on Europeanization as a means of addressing 
secessionist crises. We restrict our analysis to present-day forms of Europeanization 
and exclude past experiences in this field. We will first offer a working definition of 
Europeanization suitable for use in discussing conflict settlement and conflict 
resolution. We will then focus on the role of the European Union as a framework for 
the conflict setting and as an actor in the conflict.5 When analysing the Union’s role as 
a player, we will put particular stress on Europeanization through conditionality and 
Europeanization through social learning.  
 
                                               
4 The settlement of secessionist conflicts through the creation of an asymmetric federation, an 
associated state or a freely associated state are all based on the principle of asymmetric federalism.  
5 On the distinction between the EU as an actor organization and as a framework organization see 
Christopher Hill, “The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 
6, No. 3 (2001), p. 325. 
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1.2.1 Defining Europeanization 
 
Europeanization as an analytical concept is used to examine the changes in domestic 
structures and policies that occur in response to policies and practices institutionalized 
at the European level. It stands for a process in which European rules, mechanisms 
and collective understandings interact with given domestic structures. This means that 
Europeanization is marked by interrelationships between the various layers 
constituting the European multi-level structure.  
Scholars of Europeanization have offered different definitions of the concept, 
and have used it for a variety of research purposes.6 Definitions stress, for instance, 
the distinct features of governance within the European Union that are exported 
beyond its borders, or the impact of European integration dynamics on domestic 
policy-making processes, discourses and identities. It is notable that none of the 
definitions attempts to create a link between Europeanization and conflict settlement 
or conflict resolution in the context of secessionist crises.  
In the area of conflict settlement, conflict transformation and conflict 
resolution, the EU can act in two ways. It can provide a framework for resolving the 
constitutional dilemmas related to secessionist crises, and/or it can act directly as a 
mediator or indirectly by supporting mediation efforts between the parties involved in 
the conflict. The intention of this study is to probe the extension of the 
Europeanization concept in the direction of secessionist conflicts in countries on the 
European periphery that were not EU members in 2003, but sought to develop closer 
relations with the EU or had by then already been granted applicant status. In other 
words, for the purpose of this study we restrict the scope of application of this concept 
in two ways. The first restriction is geographical, and refers to the periphery of the 
                                               
6 Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso define Europeanization as the emergence 
and development of distinct structures of governance at the European level (Thomas Risse, Maria 
Green Cowles and James Caporaso (eds), Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), p. 1. Robert Ladrech understands Europeanization as an “incremental process 
reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics 
become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Robert Ladrech, 
“Europeanization of Democratic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, p. 70). Johan P. Olsen differentiates between five possible 
meanings of Europeanization. According to him, Europeanization may refer to changes in the external 
territorial boundaries of the EU, to the development of institutions of governance at EU level, to central 
penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance, to the export of forms of distinctively 
European political organization and governance beyond the territory of the EU, and to a political 
project aiming at a unified and politically stronger EU (Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of 
Europeanization”, ARENA Working Papers, 2002, WP 01/2, 
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm). Claudio M. Radaelli defines Europeanization as a 
process of “(a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are 
first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Claudio M. Radaelli, “The 
Europeanization of Public Policy”, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of 
Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 30). Most studies of Europeanization 
have an explicit emphasis on the EU policy process and limit Europeanization effects to the EU 
member states. Olsen suggests a possible transfer of EU rules, procedures and paradigms to third 
countries but it is Heather Grabbe who offers a systematic analysis of the EU’s impact on the applicant 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the EU accession process (Heather Grabbe, 
“Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process”, in K. Featherstone 
and C. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 
309-310). 
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EU. The second restriction is thematic, limiting the main focus of the study to 
secessionist conflicts with an ethno-political dimension.  
Before we propose a working definition of Europeanization applicable to the 
field of conflict settlement and conflict resolution in divided states, a distinction needs 
to be made between Europeanization exclusively in the EU context and 
Europeanization in the context of the EU’s periphery. In the EU context, 
Europeanization is an interactive process in which member states affected by the 
process of EU integration are at the same time the players who initiate and shape this 
process. There is thus a two-way relationship between structure and agency. Agency 
is transformed as a result of participation in EU structures. Transformed agency can 
then lead to a further transformation of structures, triggering a cyclical 
interrelationship between the two.  
Where the EU’s periphery is concerned, the dynamics of the Europeanization 
process are different. These states have varying degrees and different types of 
institutional contacts with the EU. Their relations are determined largely by 
geographical and geopolitical factors, linked in turn with the institutional choices and 
constraints decided on by the EU itself, with regard to its degree of external 
involvement. The distinctive feature of Europeanization at the EU periphery is that 
states affected by this process do not have the institutional means to co-determine 
decisions of the EU that affect them. In this context, Europeanization takes on a 
foreign policy dimension, and can thus be seen as a foreign policy instrument of the 
Union.  
Based on these conceptual clarifications, the following working definition will 
be applied in this research: Europeanization in the field of secessionist conflict 
settlement and resolution should be understood as a process which is activated 
and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the European Union, by 
linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the 
parties involved in it into European structures. This link is made operational by 
means of specific conditionality and socialization mechanisms, which are built into 
the process of Europeanization. 
The way in which the mechanisms of Europeanization are employed by the 
EU, and their consequences for secessionist conflicts at the periphery of the EU, vary 
from case to case. The impact of EU institutions and policies on divided states at 
countries on the the EU’s periphery is felt at three levels: (1) the legal and 
administrative structures of domestic institutions; (2) domestic economic, social or 
security policies; and (3) societal changes in general, including changes in political 
representation, the party system, interest groups, domestic discourses, identities and 
other subjective aspects of politics. But it is difficult to measure the impact of 
Europeanization on each of these levels. Europeanization makes for neither a neat 
independent nor intervening variable when explaining domestic changes. 
The Europeanization of divided states is usually a highly asymmetrical 
process. There is asymmetry not only between the EU and individual states generally, 
but also in the interaction pattern between the EU and the two conflicting parties 
involved in a secessionist crisis. Indeed one of the main characteristics of the 
Europeanization of divided states is that there are no direct – or even indirect – 
institutional channels for interaction between the EU and non-recognized authorities 
from secessionist entities. EU integration and EU policies are also perceived 
differently by the conflicting parties. 
While in the EU context the Union is primarily regarded as the framework 
within which the process of Europeanization takes place, in the field of conflict 
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management an additional and equally relevant dimension – that of the EU as a player 
in its own right – needs to be included in the analysis. In certain situations, the EU’s 
role as a player, mediating between the parties in conflict or supporting the mediation 
efforts, is linked to the role it will have as a framework during the post-conflict 
situation, when the parties will participate in its decision-making. The EU’s role as an 
active player is usually intended to have short-term effects on the conflict, whereas its 
function as a framework has mainly long-term implications. 
It is thus important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the EU’s potential 
for influencing the political behaviour of players on the ground – by offering rewards 
and punishments that can change the conflict dynamic, guiding it towards a negotiated 
settlement of the conflict – and, on the other hand, the EU’s potential for offering 
alternative solutions for conflict settlement, through its institutional system and levels 
of governance. 
The first dimension – that of ‘EU as an active player’ – can affect the short-
term strategies of the parties in a secessionist conflict and steer them towards an 
agreement, thus providing the necessary external push for conflict settlement. If the 
EU deploys the right set of incentives and disincentives to the conflict situation, it can 
also have a more lasting effect on the parties’ interests and identities, thus 
contributing to the sustainability of a settlement.  
The second dimension – ‘the EU as a framework’ – adds new constitutional 
and policy options to the list of available solutions to the disputed issues in the 
conflict, and as such can have both a short-term and a long-term impact on the 
institutional structure and/or policy choices of third countries. The EU can also serve 
as a general point of reference with regard to various governance practices and 
standards, thus contributing indirectly to conflict settlement and conflict resolution.  
These two dimensions are not unrelated and may be intertwined, depending on 
the particular conflict case in question. There is considerable overlap between the 
roles of ‘EU as actor’ and ‘EU as framework’ in two cases. First, in countries with a 
confirmed European perspective where the pre-accession requirements give the EU 
serious leverage in the secessionist crisis. Second, in secessionist conflicts where the 
overarching EU tier of governance can present innovative institutional solutions. The 
interplay between the two roles is less tangible in countries situated on its remote 
periphery, where the incentive structure of the EU as player might not be 
operationally significant, and where the prospect of closer institutional links through 
EU accession or association is not on the immediate agenda.  
We thus define Europeanization principally as EU-ization. But it is also 
critical to bear in mind that emphasizing the EU entails the risk of overlooking other 
important generators of change in the societies under discussion. In the context of 
conflict settlement and resolution, other framework organizations and players must be 
taken into consideration when analysing the effects of Europeanization. In particular, 
the Council of Europe (CoE) complements the normative appeal of the EU in the area 
of human rights protection and democratization generally. The OSCE and the United 
Nations (UN) have security mandates and are engaged in conflict management. In 
addition, unilateral players like the US and Russia have important geostrategic 
interests in some of the regions on the periphery of the EU and are in some cases 
regarded as more legitimate guarantors by the parties to the conflict. This makes it 
imperative to examine the influence of other external powers in the international 
organizations in each conflict case, specifying how they affect Europeanization 
processes in secessionist crises. In principle, other players can either complement or 
compete with the process of Europeanization, and receptiveness to both European and 
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non-European influences will vary from one case to another. We will come back to 
these aspects later on in this chapter.  
 
1.2.2 The EU as framework 
 
The search for win-win solutions to ethno-national and secessionist conflicts could be 
aided by making use of the potential role of the European third tier of governance. 
The third tier could facilitate conflict settlement and conflict resolution both at the 
institutional level and in the policy fields of economy, politics and security. But 
adding new and innovative options also requires the existence of domestic political 
players who are willing to seize them. 
What precise advantages and potential are offered by the EU framework? In 
cases where ethno-political and secessionist conflicts are characterized by absolute 
and mutually exclusive positions over statehood and sovereignty, the Union’s multi-
level framework of governance could increase the potential for win-win agreements. 
This is because of the fundamentally transformed application of statehood, 
sovereignty and – subsequently – of secession within the Union. Sovereignty is shared 
in practice, and is no longer absolute and undivided. Although the Union is 
predominantly constituted and shaped by its member states, through its policies and 
its institutions it blurs the black-and-white legalistic differences between monolithic 
and divided sovereignty. Decision-making and implementation in a given policy area 
are determined by a particular allocation of powers between levels of government. 
While different levels of government remain legally distinct, in practice they become 
inter-related and interdependent through different channels of communication and 
policy procedures. The supra-national level penetrates the national level as a number 
of powers originally regulated by nation states are dealt with either exclusively or in 
part by the European Union, particularly in the area of economics, and justice and 
home affairs. As a result, the role of the second (state) level within the EU is 
fundamentally transformed. While remaining fully fledged ‘states’, EU member states 
delegate several sovereign powers to ‘Brussels’, and within the Council of Ministers 
decisions in most spheres are taken on the basis of majority rule.  
The EU framework also increases the scope for sub-state-level roles in EU 
policy-making. This does not mean that EU membership necessarily upgrades the 
roles and status of the sub-state level of governance. Rather it provides greater 
opportunities for developing it. Whether these opportunities are seized depends on the 
internal structure of the member states, i.e., on the extent to which federated entities 
and regions already have clearly identified roles within their state. If and when 
regional levels of government play important roles within their member state, their 
position can be further strengthened within the EU. Two important examples in this 
respect are the opportunities for sub-state players to participate in Council of 
Ministers meetings and the opportunities for direct contact between sub-state players 
and supra-state EU institutions.7  
The EU framework fosters the development of multiple rather than exclusive 
identities.8 EU citizenship becomes an additional layer of identification, which does 
                                               
7 For a more detailed explanation of the relevance of the Belgian model in the context of Cyprus, see 
Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, Cyprus as Lighthouse of the Eastern Mediterranean (Brussels: 
CEPS, 2002), http:// www.ceps.be. 
8 Thomas Diez, “Why the EU Can Nonetheless Be Good for Cyprus”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and 
Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE), Issue 2 (2002), http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus2-
2002_Diez.pdf. 
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not necessarily compete with national identifications. This additional layer of EU 
citizenship could ease tensions in ethno-political conflicts by leading to a greater 
acceptance of multiple identities generally. 
The transformation of the meaning of borders within the EU could also 
increase the potential for the resolution and transformation of ethno-political conflicts. 
The liberalization of the movement of goods, services, capital and people within the 
Union dilutes the meaning of territorial boundaries between member states. 
Consequently, in cases of ethno-political conflicts where the drawing or re-drawing of 
territorial borders is an issue on the conflict settlement agenda, the EU framework 
could improve prospects for an agreement. It would do so by increasing the feasibility 
of a non-linear border. In other words, within the EU framework a map of straight 
lines would be less of a necessity, given the purely administrative nature of both intra- 
and inter-state borders in the EU. This in turn could facilitate an agreement on 
territorial adjustments between ethnic communities. 
Finally, specific Commission funds have been allocated for weakening inter-
state borders and encouraging the creation of European border-regions, straddling EU 
member states. Such funds could also be an important asset in conflict-ridden 
countries where the redefinition of territorial borders and the opening of previously 
blockaded frontiers is contingent on economic considerations.  
 
1.2.3 The EU as third-party actor 
 
The role of third parties in ethno-national and secessionist conflicts has been explored 
extensively in the literature on conflict settlement, conflict transformation and conflict 
resolution. Conflict settlement (or management) approaches revolve around how 
resourceful – and not necessarily impartial – mediators exert leverage on the 
conflicting parties. By exerting leverage, the mediators shift the relative balance of 
bargaining strength and create incentives for a negotiated settlement. These efforts 
may lead to a cease-fire or settlement, but do not necessarily lead to conflict 
resolution. The trading of gains and losses, or arm-twisting by the third party, may 
eliminate excessive violence and instability. The third party may also be able to bring 
the conflicting parties together in a co-operative process for the constructive 
management of differences. This may be achieved for instance by providing 
additional institutional resources to the parties to help them overcome their mutual 
antagonism. But the causes of the conflict itself – i.e., the effective incompatibility of 
subject positions – are not necessarily modified through such a process.9 Conflict 
transformation is defined by Thomas Diez as the transformation of subject positions 
from incompatibility/antagonism to compatibility/tolerance.10 Conflict resolution 
suggests the ending of the negative or mutually destructive aspects of the conflict 
itself. Conflicts between the parties may persist, but they do so within the boundaries 
of a democratic debate and dialogue.11 
                                               
9 Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, 
(Stockholm: International Idea, 1998), p. 20.  
10 See Thomas Diez, “‘Roots’ of Conflict, Conflict Transformation and EU Influence. Summary of 
Initial Comments, European Commission Workshop”, Brussels, 14 February 2003, 
http://euborderconf.bham.ac.uk/publications/files/brussels20030214.pdf (accessed on 11 December 
2003). 
11 Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, 
op. cit., pp. 17-18.  
  11
Conflict settlement, transformation and resolution approaches need not be 
mutually exclusive – on the contrary, they can very usefully complement one 
another.12 Different approaches could be used at different stages of a conflict. 
Conflicts evolve over time. At different stages, different forms of third-party 
intervention may be useful in unblocking deadlock or facilitating de-escalation. 
Furthermore, conflict settlement, transformation and resolution efforts can be 
mutually reinforcing. All-encompassing conflict resolution can only gain momentum 
once a negotiated settlement has been reached, particularly in the case of intra-state 
secessionist conflicts with blockaded frontiers and segregated communities. Likewise, 
conflict resolution efforts should both foster the conditions for an agreement and help 
to consolidate peace accords.  
In most of the so-called frozen conflicts on the European periphery, mediation 
directed at transforming the configuration of underlying interests is essential. Yet a 
change in structure is also important, to the extent that it transforms the underlying 
conditions that gave rise to the conflict. Europeanization could provide the 
mechanisms to generate these changes. In what follows we concentrate on two main 
mechanisms of Europeanization: conditionality and social learning.13 They can be 
viewed as the main instruments constituting the EU’s capacity for foreign policy 
action on its periphery.  
 
1.2.4 Europeanization through conditionality 
 
Over the last decade, and in the process of its eastern enlargement, the EU developed 
its conditionality policies as means to transform the governing structures, economy 
and civil society of the applicant states. Heather Grabbe makes the case for a powerful 
Europeanization effect in EU applicant countries through the conditionality built into 
the EU accession process.14 
The main thrust of the EU conditionality model is based on cost-benefit 
calculations in which domestic change is a response by the applicants to the material 
and social benefits offered by the EU, such as financial and technical assistance, 
institutional ties, market access and an invitation to begin accession negotiations.15 In 
Grabbe’s view, two specific intervening factors apply to EU applicants: the 
                                               
12 See for example David Bloomfield, “Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution 
and Settlement in Northern Ireland”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1995), pp. 151-164. 
13 Drawing on the literature of two distinct strands of institutionalism – rational choice institutionalism 
and sociological institutionalism – Boerzel and Risse discern two pathways of domestic change in 
response to Europeanization: (1) domestic redistribution of power among political and societal players 
as a result of new opportunities and constraints arising from the European-level policies and 
institutions; and (2) socialization and social learning leading to the internalization of new norms and 
the development of new identities (Boerzel and Risse, in Featherstone and Radaelli, op. cit., pp. 58-69). 
According to Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, in the case of the EU member states, a ‘goodness of fit’ test 
between European-level and domestic-level processes determines the degree of ‘adaptational pressures’ 
on member states, although mediating factors can facilitate change, and can also account for the 
differential impact of Europeanization. In this context the authors examine multiple veto points, 
mediation by formal institutions and political and organizational cultures as intervening variables 
leading to differential empowerment and learning in member states. See Thomas Risse, Maria Green 
Cowles and James Caporaso (eds), Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001).  
14 Grabbe, op. cit. 
15 Frank Schimmelfennig, S. Engert and H. Knobel, “Costs, Commitment, and Compliance. The Impact 
of EU Democratic Conditionality on European Non-Member States”, EUI Working Paper RSC 
2002/29 (Florence: EUI, 2002). 
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asymmetry of their relationship with the EU and the uncertainty embedded in the 
accession process itself. These two factors help to explain the differentiated responses 
to EU ‘adaptational pressures’ in Central and Eastern Europe.16  
Depending on the depth and speed of the transformation process, EU 
institutions determine when and whether to give the green light either to the different 
stages along the accession process or to the delivery of additional benefits. The stages 
that have applied to the Central and Eastern European Countries include: privileged 
access to trade and aid, signing and implementing enhanced association agreements, 
the starting of accession negotiations, the opening and closing of thirty-one chapters 
of the acquis communautaire, the signing of the Accession Treaty, ratification the 
Accession Treaty by member state parliaments and the European Parliament and, 
finally, entry into the EU.  
In the sphere of conflict settlement, the EU’s policy of ‘carrots and sticks’ and 
its direct involvement as a mediator in a secessionist conflict constitute the core of its 
potential for exerting influence. Thanks to its superior power vis-à-vis the parties, the 
EU is in a position either directly to coerce them into agreeing on an acceptable 
solution or indirectly to shift the domestic balance of power by encouraging moderate 
groups and discouraging hard-liners. The strongest incentive the EU can put on the 
negotiating table to guide nudge the parties towards a conflict settlement is the 
prospect of EU membership, but other forms of partnership with the EU are also an 
option. In particular, progressive inclusion in EU common policies such as the single 
market or justice and home affairs, without formal institutional insertion into EU 
structures, can also act as a strong inducement.  
These ultimate rewards give the EU the leverage necessary to demand 
institutional and policy changes that are a matter of dispute between the parties 
involved in a conflict. Most often, disagreements on the conflict agenda concern 
specific issues such as trade, monetary policy, taxation, refugee policy, citizenship 
questions, border control and all the institutional issues to do with who has authority 
over decision-making in these and other policy areas. By attaching specific rewards to 
preferred solutions to these open questions, the EU can intervene directly in the 
conflict dynamic, helping either to find a compromise that satisfies both sides or to 
widen the gap between them by exacerbating their differences. 
But how do conditionality policies – whether directly or indirectly related to 
conflict settlement and conflict resolution efforts – change domestic practices?17 
Rational institutionalism argues that domestic players are goal-oriented and 
purposeful. They engage in strategic interactions, using their resources in ways that 
maximize their usefulness on the basis of ordered preferences. They weigh the costs 
and benefits of different strategies, anticipating the other’s behaviour. EU 
conditionality generates ‘simple learning’. This means that rationally calculating 
players, confronted by institutional constraints, may easily alter their strategies and 
tactics in order to achieve their objectives. But this does not mean that they will 
therefore change their underlying identities.18  
                                               
16 Grabbe, 2003. The Union developed two main steps in the process: gate-keeping, and bench-marking 
and monitoring. See Heather Grabbe “How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6 (2001), pp. 
1013-131. 
17 For an analysis of the effects of Europeanization on domestic change, see Tanja Boerzel and Thomas 
Risse “When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change”, European Integration Online 
Papers, Vol. 4 (2000), No. 15, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015.htm. 
18 See Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1999), pp. 83-114, p. 90; and Jeffrey Checkel, “Social 
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EU conditionality policies can have either a direct effect, by prescribing one 
particular solution or ruling out another, or an indirect effect by altering the domestic 
opportunity structure.19 In the former case, these policies can influence the whole 
range of feasible solutions in peace negotiations. If the EU categorically rules out the 
option of secession within an applicant or potential applicant state, both the main and 
the secessionist entities may have to concentrate on compromise solutions, such as a 
loose federation. The extent to which this will alter the positions of the two parties 
will depend on how much they value the incentives offered by the EU. 
Yet given the EU’s limited ability to prescribe legislation and policies beyond 
its borders, conditionality affects domestic change principally by altering the domestic 
opportunity structure. EU conditionality policies may offer resources and 
legitimization to some domestic players while constraining the ability of others to 
pursue their goals. The EU’s capacity to mobilize domestic actors crucially depends 
on the will, resources and interests of particular groups, as well as on the existence of 
cohesive pro-European identities around which interests can be mobilized. 
According to Marina Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, the extent 
to which ‘adaptational pressures’ generate domestic change depends on the ‘goodness 
of fit’ between EU and domestic practices.20 To what extent is there compatibility 
between domestic practices and EU standards and conditions? Great incompatibility 
makes conditionality unlikely to have any effect. When, instead, some groups within 
the domestic political system are working towards change in a direction similar to that 
advocated by the EU, conditionality could strengthen these groups and/or modify the 
direction of policy change. When EU conditionality legitimizes the discourse of 
particular domestic players, EU conditions are absorbed or accommodated and 
become part of domestic political dynamics.  
But the extent to which these conditions actually alter domestic practices may 
remain limited. Domestic positions may be reframed only superficially, through a 
different political discourse, which now includes an additional EU dimension. Real 
policy practices or bargaining positions are then not necessarily altered significantly. 
However, EU conditionality may also transform domestic policies or positions 
beyond the level of political rhetoric. This may occur when EU conditionality 
contributes to a change in the domestic political configuration, for example by 
influencing electoral results.  
The impact of EU conditionality on the domestic opportunity structure thus 
depends critically on the value attached to EU benefits by various groups within the 
society, and on the extent to which the various domestic players are generally 
committed to the EU integration project.  
 
1.2.5 Europeanization through social learning 
 
Conditionality is not the sole mechanism for channelling EU influence. Equally 
important in analysing the possible impact of the EU on its peripheries are the 
socialization processes of domestic political élites and the social learning processes of 
                                                                                                                                      
Construction and Integration”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), 545-560, at p. 
546. 
19 Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, “How Europe Matters: Mechanisms of Europeanization”, 
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 3, No. 7 (1999), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm 
20 Marina Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, “Europeanization and Domestic Change”, in 
T.Risse, M.G.Cowles and J.A.Caporaso (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic 
change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 1-20. 
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societies as a whole. While conditionality can be expected to operate mostly in the 
short run, socialization – by affecting the strategies of domestic players – has longer-
term effects and can impact on the way in which domestic players define their 
interests and identities. The constitutive norms of the EU – in terms of both its liberal 
market principles and its standards of democratic governance – play an important role 
by offering a point of reference to all external players who seek closer relations with 
it. Furthermore, the EU institutions responsible for foreign policy are both ‘sites of 
socialization’, through initiating exchanges with third countries’ élites, and 
‘promoters of socialization’ through engaging in persuasion and argumentation in 
relation to ideas and proposals.21 
Social constructivist literature argues that, through participation in common 
institutional structures, players change their identity and also, therefore, their 
perceived interests and ensuing action. This can occur in a top-down fashion, where 
‘agents of change’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in close contact with the international 
framework mobilize other domestic élites and the general population, and persuade 
them to change their perception of their interests.22 Bottom-up change is also possible. 
In this case, non-state players unite in their support for international norms and 
mobilize to induce decision-makers to change state policies.  
Social learning is a process based on interaction, and the dense institutional 
environment of the EU is particularly well suited to socializing agents from within.23 
With regard to non-EU members, the success of socialization will depend to a large 
extent on the density of institutional ties and contacts between the EU and these third 
countries, and on the legitimacy of EU-promoted norms and policies as perceived by 
the external players.24  
The EU’s willingness to engage directly in a secessionist conflict as a 
mediator, and its commitment to integrating a country into its own institutional 
framework, affect the opportunities for institutional and private dialogue with the 
opposing sides. The success of socialization will then depend on how well the conflict 
solutions offered or promoted by the EU resonate with domestic political visions and 
conflict solutions.25 It is also likely that the EU’s suggestions and demands will not be 
considered equally legitimate by both sides in a secessionist conflict. Within each of 
the parties in a secessionist conflict, EU-sponsored ideas and proposals will generally 
be accepted more readily by some domestic groups and political formations than 
others. The consistency of the messages conveyed by the different institutional 
structures of the EU will also affect the credibility of the EU’s line, and how 
favourably it is received by local players. The salience of European geostrategic 
orientations among political élites on the periphery, as opposed to Russian or 
American ones, is also critical in this respect. 
                                               
21 See Jeffrey Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework”. Oslo: ARENA, 2003, available from www.arena.uio.no/Checkel.htm. 
22 Peter Haas, “Epistemic communities and international policy coordination”, International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-36. 
23 See Jeffrey Checkel, “Social Construction and European Integration”, in Thomas Christiansen, E. 
Jorgensen & A. Wiener (eds), The Social Construction of Europe (London: SAGE Publications, 2001). 
24 Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, op. cit. 
25 Thomas Risse develops the resonance argument to account for differential Europeanization of 
nation-state identities in the EU. He argues that “… some collective nation-state identities resonate 
more with Europeanization than others and are expected to incorporate understandings of Europe and 
of European order earlier.” Thomas Risse, “A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of 
Nation-State Identities”, in Thomas Risse, M. Cowles and J. Caporaso (eds), Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press, 2001), p. 202. 
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1.2.6 The relationship between the two Europeanization mechanisms 
 
Are the mechanisms of change – through policies of conditionality on the one hand 
and through norm diffusion and social learning on the other – mutually exclusive or 
complementary? There are certainly important differences between the two. Change 
through conditionality policies may occur in the short to medium term, as actors with 
unchanged identities and interests simply alter their actions to adapt to a change in the 
situation. More genuine and deep-rooted change, which occurs through the actual 
transformation of identity and interests, may only be expected over the longer term.26 
Over time, and through institutional contact (in which policies of conditionality may 
feature prominently), players may alter their perceived identity and interests. They 
first adopt a change in discourse, which is gradually internalized and results in a 
genuine changing of identity and interest. The change in action is no longer the result 
of coercion or incentives: it is the outcome of an endogenous process of change within 
the principal parties to a conflict. The importance of time in these processes of 
domestic change must be stressed. While in the initial phases of Europeanization a 
rational, institutional approach may better capture the mechanisms of change, over the 
longer term endogenous processes may become the main driving forces behind 
domestic transformation. 
The positive roles of the EU, as player and as framework, may likewise 
reinforce the mechanisms of conditionality and socialization. Particularly at the level 
of élites, conflict often persists not only because of strong threat perceptions and a 
securitized discourse, but also because of vested interests in the status quo. Leaders 
may be relatively content with a stalemate, as compared to the many uncertainties 
associated with a settlement, and will therefore lack the political will to reach an 
agreement. In such cases, it is imperative for third parties to improve the benefits of a 
settlement by providing additional resources that would induce the élites to settle. 
These resources may consist of both new incentives – in line with the EU’s role as a 
player implementing the conditionality mechanism – and new structures – in line with 
the EU’s role as a framework organization providing new resources in the 
socialization of the élites. 
There is thus a close link between the mechanisms of conditionality and 
socialization. Tanja Boerzel and Thomas Risse have suggested that the logics of 
action and interaction underpinning these two mechanisms may occur simultaneously 
notwithstanding the analytical distinction between them.27 In peace-making processes, 
the two mechanisms are not always mutually reinforcing. In some conflict cases, 
conditionality and socialization can be complementary, and can be activated to 
achieve conflict settlement and transformation. In other cases, the application of 
conditionality may reduce the prospects for socialization. Conditionality policies do 
not automatically lead over time to endogenous processes of social change. If, for 
example, conditionality is perceived by domestic players as favouring one side of the 
conflict to the detriment of the other, the possibility of socializing both sides equally 
will be lessened. If conditionality policies are viewed by one or both parties as 
insufficiently legitimate, if existing domestic practice is uncontested, if European 
norms are insufficiently related to domestic norms or if institutional ties between the 
                                               
26 Tanja Boerzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic 
Change”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 15 (2000), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-
015.htm. 
27 Boerzel and Risse, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
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EU and the parties to the conflict are too weak, conditionality may have no effect – or 
may even have an adverse effect – on social change in a divided state.  
 
1.3 Problems with applying Europeanization mechanisms 
 
In the following section, we will analyse the potential problems with applying 
Europeanization mechanisms in divided states at the European periphery. First, we 
will examine to what extent the lack of a clear definition of the idea of the EU and of 
its further enlargement prospects affects the efficiency of these mechanisms. Second, 
we will address the question of the value of the benefits delivered by European 
integration prospects. Third, we will evaluate the consequences of withdrawing 
benefits in a policy of conditionality. Fourth, we have to take into account how 
communication takes place between European peripheries and the complex 
institutional set-up that constitutes the European Union. Fifth, we will deal with the 
crucial question of minority rights in the process of Europeanizing divided states. A 
sixth problem is time lags: reforms are demanded in the short term, while benefits are 
promised in the long term. Seventh, we will focus on the problems arising when 
federal solutions are imposed from outside. The eighth and last theme addressed in 
this section are the intended and unintended effects of Europeanization. 
 
1.3.1 The idea of Europe 
 
While the process of Europeanization is generally conceptualized as being based on 
universal values and on the acceptance of the principle of multiculturalism, these 
visions are contradicted by alternative discourses on European identity that emphasize 
particularity, e.g. by highlighting specific cultural traditions, like Christianity. Such 
discourses show how Europeanization as an affirmation of a post-national order may 
be countered by exclusivist discourses.28 A retrenchment into nationalism may be 
facilitated by the ambiguities surrounding European identity.29 
This ambiguity of European identity is reinforced by the importance the EU 
attaches to the delimitation of Europe, in particular to the borders of the European 
Union. This delimitation is based on the assumption that European values are 
manifested within these territories, and that applicant countries could moreover be 
ranked according to the degree to which their political and legal systems are capable 
of expressing these values. 
Tracing the borders of Europe is a particularly relevant issue for countries on 
the European periphery. The discussion on the geographical borders of the European 
polity has occupied several political generations, and will probably engage several 
more generations to come. There are at present several European polities: the OSCE’s 
definition of Europe includes the United States, Canada, and the post-Soviet states of 
Central Asia, the Council of Europe’s definition of Europe excludes those states, and 
the European Union’s definition of Europe is an open one.   
Decisions on the next stages of European Union enlargement – after the 
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 – will not be taken soon. In the short term, 
however, the European Union needs a coherent policy on its new 2004-07 borders. 
Instead of drawing geographical borders around the hypothetical idea of a European 
                                               
28 Nicos Trimikliniotis, “The Location of Cyprus in the Southern European Context: Europeanization 
as Modernization?”, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 47-73. 
29 Claudio Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change”, 
European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 8 (2002), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm. 
  17
polity, the European Commission has put forward the idea of a ‘wider Europe’ and 
has designed a neighbourhood policy framework that would include all countries 
geographically bordering the enlarged European Union, with the exclusion of Turkey 
and those countries of the Balkans that have currently a perspective of membership to 
the European Union and are already part of existing policy frameworks. In a footnote 
to its March 2003 communication to the Council on ‘neighbourhood’ policies for a 
Wider Europe, the Commission claimed that, for geographical reasons, the South 
Caucasus states could not be included in this framework ‘for the time being’.30  
Closer relations between the EU and neighbouring countries are seen, in this 
communication from the European Commission, as promoting economic integration, 
cross-border cooperation, reforms which include legislation in line with the acquis 
communautaire, sustainable development and shared responsibility for conflict 
prevention between the EU and its neighbours. The EU wants to operate with specific 
incentives other than the mega-incentive of accession as a full member state. The 
incentives include an extension of the internal market and regulatory structures, 
prospects for the lawful migration and movement of persons, and intensified security 
cooperation: “Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern 
Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market 
and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital (four freedoms)”.31 Concrete benefits and preferential 
relations would be given in exchange for progress made by the partner countries in 
implementing reforms.32 The first action plans for individual countries were intended 
for 2004. Of our four case-studies, Moldova is included in this 2003 definition of the 
Wider Europe.  
The exclusion of the South Caucasus from the Wider Europe framework, in 
the European Commission’s document of March 2003, was related to the set of 
problems concerning endogenous processes of change. The general question arising 
from this set of problems is whether social learning is possible beyond the borders of 
the EU. Are the accession process and the different forms of contractual relations 
beyond accession, dense enough to generate a process of endogenous change that 
goes beyond altering the domestic opportunity structure? Can the principles of multi-
level governance, porous borders, multiple identities and soft security be internalized 
outside the Union beyond the level of European rhetoric? In excluding the South 
Caucasus from the Wider Europe framework, the Commission and the Council 
seemed at first to have given a negative answer to these questions, insofar as the 
prospects for deeper integration in the EU’s Internal Market through the liberalization 
of the ‘four freedoms’ are concerned. 
For countries that have no accession prospects, or that were excluded from the 
Wider Europe framework in 2003, there may be a negative exclusion effect. This 
exclusion may make it more difficult to mobilize domestic support for democratic 
reforms. This potentially negative consequence of the 2003 decision contradicts the 
European Union’s policy in support of the new Georgian president Mikheil 
                                               
30 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 11.3.2003, COM(203) 104 final, p. 4. On the 
following see Bruno Coppieters, ‘EU Policy on the Southern Caucasus’, policy paper for the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy  
of the European Parliament (meeting of 20 January 2004), on the Internet on 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/committees/afet/20040120/wider%20europe%20caucasus.pdf 
31 Ibid., p. 4. 
32 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Saakashvili. That is one of the reasons why the European Council decided, on 26 
January 2004, to ask the European Commission to prepare a new report on the 
relationship between the South Caucasus and the ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ 
policy for the middle of 2004.33  
 The EU policy instruments deployed in various categories of European 
countries such as applicants, prospective applicants, countries involved in the Wider 
Europe framework and countries beyond this framework – instruments ranging from 
an accession process, stabilization and association to less complex forms of 
partnership and cooperation – thus include different institutional capacities for 
Europeanization through conditionality and socialization. Some coherence in the 
application of the European idea in EU policies will increase the effectiveness of the 
various treaty instruments. 
 
1.3.2 The value of benefits 
 
When analysing the mechanisms of Europeanization, other potential problems related 
to the EU’s capacity to act beyond its borders need to be borne in mind. There is the 
quality of the ‘carrot’. Domestic change driven by conditionality calls for sufficiently 
valuable EU benefits. Their perceived value depends both on the objective elements 
in the EU offer and on the subjective assessment of those benefits. When full 
membership is an option, the EU’s potential leverage is higher than in cases where 
relations are based on association or on partnership and cooperation. This raises the 
question of whether the EU can significantly influence states on its periphery that it is 
not prepared to integrate fully in the near future, such as, for instance, the European 
countries of the Wider Europe.  
Furthermore, different players within a third country may value EU benefits 
differently. Domestic players have different aims and objectives. Accordingly, their 
assessment of the Union differs. Although full membership is the most powerful 
foreign policy instrument at the EU’s disposal, it may be of little value to those forces 
within a country whose aim is first and foremost to assert absolute sovereignty within 
a predefined territory, or to forces interested in a particular type of alliance with 
Russia which would rule out any involvement by the European Union in their region. 
To the extent that these forces enjoy the upper hand within the state, EU 
conditionality is unlikely to induce positive domestic change. Depending on the 
relative balance of the different domestic forces and the interaction between them, the 
overall effect of EU conditionality will be positive, negative or nil. 
The effectiveness of the conditionality mechanism largely depends on the 
possibility of Europeanization through socialization. Social learning is most likely 
when international (in this case EU) norms resonate with domestic ideas and 
practices. Yet often, in ethno-political conflicts, the discourse is based on premises 
very different from those that are characteristic of the EU. Notions of absolute 
sovereignty, exclusive identities, territorial integrity and military balance feature 
prominently in ethno-political conflicts. Such notions will affect the perceived value 
of EU instruments. 
 
1.3.3 Granting and withdrawing benefits 
 
                                               
33 2559th Council Meeting – External Relations, Brussels 26 January 2004, http:// 
ue.eu.int/pressData/en/gena/78833.pdf (accessed on 1 February 2004). 
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A further problem with EU conditionality, identified by Heather Grabbe, lies in the 
effects of ‘gate-keeping’ as a means of influence.34 EU institutions determine when 
and whether to grant a particular benefit to a third party. Yet gate-keeping cannot 
induce precise changes at precise moments in time. An effective policy of 
conditionality would necessitate an automatic entitlement to rights when obligations 
are fulfilled and the automatic withdrawal of benefits when they are not. In practice, 
these consequences are never so automatic. 
 Various political imperatives have to be taken into account. Both the granting 
and the withdrawal of a benefit to a third state require consensus within the Union. 
For an association agreement or an accession treaty to come into force, there must be 
unanimity among the member governments and ratification by national parliaments 
and the European Parliament. Such a consensus clearly depends on the fulfilment of 
its contractual obligations by the third state (i.e., in the case of membership, the 
fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the acquis). But it also 
depends on other factors, motivated by underlying political or economic imperatives. 
The eastern enlargement occurred despite the fact that some conditions had not been 
fulfilled: the importance of the enlargement far exceeded that of the minutiae of 
compliance with the acquis communautaire.  
 The same is true for the withdrawal of a benefit. The suspension of an 
agreement would eliminate the contractual links between the EU and these third 
states, and thus reduce the EU’s potential source of influence in these countries. 
In determining when and whether political conditions are met, some degree of 
political discretion is inevitable. When flagrant violations go unpunished, however, or 
when benefits are not granted despite the overall fulfilment of contractual obligations, 
then the EU’s credibility is seriously impaired. In other words, when other conditions, 
unspecified in the contract, govern the Union’s relations with third states, then EU 
conditionality policies lose their effectiveness. Not only does EU conditionality 
towards that particular third state suffer, but the Union’s general image and credibility 
are also damaged. 
Political discretion is also explained by the vagueness of certain conditions. 
When are human rights respected? When is a country sufficiently democratic? Human 
rights violations and features of undemocratic practice, racism and xenophobia exist 
within the EU as well as outside it. Instead of being clear-cut, the meeting of criteria 
is often a question of degree. In addition, the Union does not have ready-made 
benchmarks with which to monitor the implementation of reforms, nor has it any 
specific models that would give a precise idea of the kind of reform expected.  
 
1.3.4 The many voices of the EU  
 
The way in which incentives are communicated by the EU to the third country is also 
critical for the efficiency of Europeanization mechanisms. The complex institutional 
setting of EU foreign policy, and the many voices speaking for the EU on external 
relations, may sometimes distort the message. While the Council of the European 
Union, the European Council and the European Parliament may make rhetorical 
statements and take practical steps in favour of a state’s reunification within the 
framework of European integration, in its relations with the latter the Commission 
may follow a different policy. From the perspective of the Commission, it may in 
                                               
34 Heather Grabbe, “How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion 
and Diversity”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6 (2001),  p. 1020.  
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some cases be easier to integrate two sovereign states than a complex federation. It is 
far easier, for instance, for the Commission to prepare treaty negotiations or to 
negotiate with a unitary state that has clear decision-making and ratification 
procedures than with a federation, where decision-making at different levels has to be 
coordinated, generally resulting in more cumbersome ratification procedures. 
Negotiations are even more difficult with federations divided by severe conflicts 
between the federated entities or their various levels of governance. 
 
1.3.5 The protection of minority rights 
 
The meaning of conditionality is particularly relevant for many of the core issues 
relating to conflict settlement and conflict resolution in divided societies. The exact 
meaning of Europeanization in terms of minority rights is defined far less precisely 
than the economic content of the acquis communautaire.35 Europe as a politically 
integrated multicultural society offers more guarantees for the recognition and 
protection of minority rights and cultural diversity than does the framework of nation-
states.36 Europeanization places these states in a setting that offers not only models of 
federal or quasi-federal constitutions, but also supra-national institutions that can play 
a crucial role in conflict resolution. Here we should mention the EU’s innovative 
practice of multi-level governance and the role of regions within the EU.  
However, as James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse argue, EU conditionality on 
minority protection suffers from a lack of clear criteria on which to base this 
protection, especially since the application of these rights is controversial between and 
within the EU member states themselves. The EU agenda for minority rights is 
marked by constant tension between individual and group rights. Minority rights 
protection is therefore the most weakly defined of all the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, and 
there are no established EU benchmarks. As the EU’s own mechanisms for enforcing 
and monitoring compliance are poorly developed, it relies for this monitoring on 
international organizations, such as the CoE or the OSCE, or on NGOs.37  
The relation between EU conditionality and the institutionalization of minority 
rights is further determined by the particular importance attached to the strengthening 
of the state institutions of former communist countries (the majority of applicants), 
especially those that have recently acquired independence. This focus means that 
great emphasis is laid on strengthening the legitimacy of these institutions, including 
by providing support for a nation-building process. In such contexts, the defence of 
minority rights may be defined as facilitating access to the majority culture for 
members of minorities, rather than as a protection of minority cultures.38  
 
1.3.6 Time lags 
 
EU conditionality entails the problem of a time lag. Particularly within the accession 
process, reforms are demanded in the short and medium term, while the benefits 
                                               
35 James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse, “Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and 
Minority Protection in the CEECs”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 1 
(2003), http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Hughes_Sasse.pdf. 
36 Nicos Trimikliniotis, “The Location of Cyprus in the Southern European Context: Europeanization 
as Modernization?”, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 47-73. 
37 Hughes & Sasse, op. cit, pp. 12-13. 
38 Hughes & Sasse, op. cit.; Eiki Berg & Wim Van Meurs, “Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of 
Nation- and State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova”, Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2002), pp. 51-74. 
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(membership) are actually delivered in the long term. This generates two sets of 
problems. First, because of their unpredictability, long-term benefits are valued less 
than short-term ones, and this diminishes the potential incentives for reform generated 
by EU conditionality. Secondly, time lags may also encourage domestic policy-
makers to delay reforms until the delivery of the benefits is nearer. This may be 
particularly true in conflict situations. The settlement of an ethno-political conflict 
through the acceptance of a compromise agreement is viewed by the parties as taking 
a leap into the unknown. Even in cases where mutually beneficial agreements are 
possible, agreeing and implementing a solution to a secessionist crisis is generally 
perceived as highly risky. EU membership can be viewed as a hedge against risk, 
thanks to the particular types of security guarantees embedded in EU accession. The 
parties to a conflict may therefore be reluctant to reach an agreement until the 
prospects of membership are closer and surer.  
 
1.3.7 The problems associated with externally imposed federal solutions 
 
Generally speaking, a constitutionally entrenched division of power between different 
levels of governance which is based on the freely given consent of the whole 
population – including its minorities – does not create a severe political dilemma. But 
the situation is more complicated when the federalization of a state divided along 
ethnic lines has to address the consequences of a unilateral declaration of secession 
that has led to a full-scale war. This problem is not peculiar to the Europeanization of 
secessionist conflicts, but generally has to be addressed in all secessionist conflicts in 
which a third party attempts to impose federal solutions.  
Once mass violence has taken place, the choices entailed in a peace settlement 
cease to be as free as they are in the absence of violence. A violent secessionist 
conflict follows a logic of its own, particularly when it leads to the creation of a de 
facto state. The war itself is a contest of wills outside the framework of a commonly 
accepted constitutional order, and is regulated only by a restricted set of international 
rules (international humanitarian law). These legal regulations generally fail to be 
enforced, which increases the difficulty in subsequently reaching an agreement 
considered just by both sides. The international security organizations also follow 
very particular legal rules when mediating in the aftermath of a violent conflict 
between a recognized government and the leadership of a de facto state.  
In dealing with a post-war situation in a secessionist conflict, it is generally 
difficult to reach a federal agreement (or any other type) without some degree of 
external pressure. But the degree of external pressure used to create new state 
institutions (which can range from conditionality – reflected in various forms of 
cooperation – all the way to outright military force) will negatively affect their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the parties concerned. The difficulty of implementing such 
types of solution explains the need to apply a comprehensive set of normative 
principles in concrete cases, in order to judge the legitimacy of such an effort.39 These 
principles are summarized in the box below.40  
                                               
39 See Bruno Coppieters, “Conclusion: Just War Theory and the Ethics of Secession”, in Bruno 
Coppieters and Richard Sakwa (eds), Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 252-279 and Bruno Coppieters, “Secession 
and War: A Moral Analysis of the Russian-Chechen Conflict”, in: Central Asian Survey, December 
2003, Vol. 22, No 4, pp. 377-404.  
40 This set of principles is based on a reinterpretation of the various principles to be found in just war 
theory. The just war tradition analyses the legitimate use of violent means. Both the decision to start a 
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THE FORCEFUL IMPOSITION OF A FEDERAL SOLUTION 
 
(1) It is one of the primary tasks of any state to correct or prevent injustices. But a 
federal settlement that does not reflect a consensual agreement between the 
population groups concerned, or the direct imposition of a federal framework 
by outside powers, should have a more specific ‘just cause’. There should be 
an urgent need to reunify a country, in application of the principle of territorial 
integrity, or to safeguard the right to national self-determination. The need to 
create an appropriate framework for safeguarding the right of refugees to 
return to their homes is a further instance in which the imposition of a federal 
compromise maybe justified. 
(2) The compromise solution or the imposition of a federal framework should be 
guided by the ‘right intentions’ of the external players involved in the 
mediation process, which should be consistent with a ‘just cause’.  
(3) A federal compromise solution imposed from the outside which largely 
opposes the consensual will of the parties involved may only be a ‘last resort’ 
solution for remedying or preventing injustices. Before this step is taken, it 
must be very clear that all efforts to achieve the same objectives by means of 
consensual solutions have proved fruitless.  
(4) Only a ‘legitimate authority’ may impose external pressure on the parties to a 
conflict. The UN (in the case of the use of force) and the EU (in applying 
conditionality) may act as a ‘legitimate authority’ in exercising pressure on the 
parties in conflict in order to achieve compromise solutions. The conditions 
under which the UN Security Council may decide on the character of such a 
federal arrangement and its forceful implementation are specified in the UN 
Charter. 
(5) A ‘reasonable chance of success’ in upholding the ‘just cause’ is a prerequisite 
for a federal compromise or the imposition of a federal solution. The 
probability of a breakdown of the federal arrangement under conditions 
leading to a new violent conflict would destroy the legitimacy of such an 
arrangement. The extent of the violence preceding a settlement, and the degree 
of external pressure exercised in order to reach an agreement, will affect its 
likelihood of success in various ways.  
(6) The principle of ‘proportionality’ must be respected: the anticipated cost of 
imposing a federal model should not be disproportionate to the expected 
benefits, by which is meant the remedying or prevention of injustices.  
 
In a normative analysis of the legitimacy of an externally imposed federal model, 
each of these principles has to be applied separately to a concrete case-study. State 
structures resulting from a federal arrangement have to be able to remedy or prevent 
injustices, and in applying this just cause principle must be based on the right 
intention.  
                                                                                                                                      
war and the use of military means in waging it must be in accordance with each of the individual just 
war principles. These principles are as follows: (1) a war should have a ‘just cause’, i.e., the injustices 
to be prevented or remedied should be serious enough to justify the use of military force. (2) The 
decision should be guided by ‘right intentions’. (3) Only a ‘legitimate authority’ may launch a war to 
uphold a ‘just cause’. (4) A ‘reasonable chance of success’ in upholding the ‘just cause’ is a 
prerequisite for starting military operations. (5) The principle of ‘proportionality’ – cost-benefit 
calculation – must be respected. (6) The use of violence may only be a ‘last resort’ solution.  
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Forms of representation and type of governance must also be in accordance with 
the principle of legitimate authority. The federal arrangement must, moreover, have a 
reasonable chance of success, and its moral benefits must outweigh its costs, in 
accordance with the ‘proportionality’ principle.  
All principles are thus crucial. The ‘last resort’ principle stresses the exceptional 
nature of the use of external pressure to achieve a legitimate federal solution. The 
right of the international community to impose a federal state on conflicting parties as 
a ‘last resort’ may be compared with the right to wage war. In the just war tradition, 
the latter is to be regarded as an exception to the general rule that parties in conflict 
must seek a peaceful means of settling that conflict. A federal settlement to a 
secessionist conflict, imposed by external pressure or force, must be considered an 
exception to the rule that federalism should reflect the freely given consent of the 
population – or, in the case of a multinational state, the populations – involved. Such 
an imposition may therefore be used only as a last resort. 
Although all the principles must be applied separately to a concrete setting, it must 
be borne in mind that they are closely related to one other. Regarding the ‘just cause’ 
principle, federalization imposed using outside force may in fact remedy existing 
injustices or prevent future ones. It may restore the territorial integrity of a country, 
introduce a limited right to national self-determination for national minorities and 
grant refugees the right to return to their homes or to obtain fair compensation for 
property they have lost.  
Generally speaking, it is unlikely that an agreement on federalization resulting 
from a high degree of external pressure will be perceived as fair by all parties to the 
conflict. This will undoubtedly lead to accusations that basic state interests are being 
betrayed. Those on the secessionist side who oppose a negotiated federal solution will 
stress the idea that the sovereign character of their ‘state’ precludes its legitimate 
inclusion in a federation. Those who oppose the concessions made by the central 
government to the secessionist party will similarly stress the fact that the terms of the 
federalization process – particularly the way in which power is divided by the levels 
of government – have been imposed on them by force, or by outside forces. The 
likelihood of success of the federal arrangement will then depend on the degree of 
external pressure and on the design of the federal institutions themselves, such as 
electoral rules. Reconciliation procedures to deal with the pre-accord violence may 
also reinforce post-accord stability. 
Thus the individual principles are affected in various ways by the degree of 
external pressure used to reach a federal settlement. The degree of pressure then used 
to enforce a settlement will affect not only the ‘likelihood of success’ of the federal 
structure, but also the ‘proportionality’ calculation. From this perspective, it is 
necessary to analyse the potentially negative effects of an externally imposed solution 
on the efficiency of state institutions, on the principle of democratic representation, 
and on the degree of self-sustainability of the state institutions. The principles of 
‘likelihood of success’ and of ‘proportionality’ are in this case closely linked: if the 
likelihood of success of an imposed federal settlement is small, costs are generally out 
of proportion to benefits. 
 It may be concluded that the degree and type of external pressure are a crucial 
variable in the achievement of a federal agreement that is considered just and 
legitimate by the conflicting parties. External pressure may range from the military 
imposition of a federal solution to milder forms – such as those applied through 
conditionality in the framework of EU integration. It is not necessarily the case, 
however, that the likelihood of success of imposed federal constitutions or their 
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legitimacy are inversely proportional to the degree of external pressure applied. Such 
questions must be examined on a case-by-case basis. But this overview suffices to 
demonstrate that, as a general rule, and despite their unintended effects, the ‘soft’ 
mechanisms of Europeanization – conditionality and socialization – do not create the 
same problems in the formation of new federations and other federal arrangements as 
the harsher forms of external pressure, such as sanctions or the use of force. 
 
1.3.8 Intended and unintended effects of the EU’s conflict settlement policies  
 
The EU’s potential for conflict settlement through its Europeanization mechanisms 
can produce both intended and unintended results. The latter are intricately linked to 
the potential problems inherent in the mechanisms of Europeanization highlighted 
above. As outlined in the earlier parts of this chapter, the EU’s general policy stance 
is to favour common state solutions and to discourage secession. This position is 
motivated mainly by a refusal to accept unilateral changes of borders, the expected 
domino effect of increasing demands for independence and the repercussions of 
secession for ethnic co-existence in the contested territories. To avoid setting 
precedents, the EU opposes demands for the recognition of secessionist entities.  
In principle, however, there are other policy options besides supporting a 
single sovereignty outcome in conflict situations. One model, indeed, would be to 
mobilize EU foreign-policy instruments and apply conditionality to the parties in the 
conflict, with the objective of keeping them together in one state. This is possible 
when both parties wish to be more closely linked to the EU. A second model would 
be to offer Europeanization-related incentives to one of the entities while isolating the 
other until it abandons its uncompromising ideas and returns to the negotiating table. 
A third model would be to engage in bilateral relations with the two entities separately 
– this would include a normalization of EU relations with the secessionist entity, up to 
the (reluctant) recognition of its independence.  
There are important distinctions in the immediate objectives of these policy 
options, and although the EU has been inclined to consider only the first two models, 
the third is also worth examining. The intended and unintended effects of these 
models will be different depending on the party to whom the EU is willing to grant its 
conditional support. There are also different constraints on the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms of conditionality and socialization in the three models (see matrix). 
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Europeanization and Conflict Settlement: Intended and Unintended Effects 
 









EU policy EU favours a common state 
solution and offers the joint 
entity privileged access to 
EU resources and 
institutions. 
EU applies ‘common state’ 
conditionality on both 
entities. 
EU socializes the common 
state. 
EU favours one of the 
entities depending on: 
a) the democratic 
credentials of its regime; 
b) the reformist credentials 
of its government; 
c) the ‘reasonableness’ of 
its leadership in 
negotiations. 
EU offers the preferred entity 
privileged access to its 
resources and institutions. 
EU may, as last resort, grant 
recognition to the 
secessionist entity if it is 
considered the ‘reasonable’ 
partner; but not if it is 
‘unreasonable’. 
EU applies pressure on the 
‘unreasonable’ entity. 
EU socializes the preferred 
entity. 
EU accepts secession 
reluctantly and may even 
grant recognition to both 
entities. EU offers privileged 
access to its resources and 
institutions to both parties but 
makes this conditional on 
their individually fulfilling 
the Copenhagen criteria: 
a) democracy; 
b) market economy; 
c) rule of law. 
 







Conflict transformation takes 
place.  
Players increasingly see the 
benefits of the common state. 
Institution-building at the 
common state level. 
Isolation of the 
‘unreasonable’ entity, aimed 
at policy or even regime 
change. 
Resolution of the conflict 
postponed until the isolated 
entity comes back to the 
negotiating table with a 
‘reasonable’ position. 
Conflict resolved through 
‘velvet divorce’.  
Secession formalized. 
Democratization and 
economic development of 
both entities, to prevent 
conflict in the future. 
Unintended 
effects 
Creation of a superficial layer 
of common institutions. 
Main entity sees benefits 
from the dissolution of the 
common state. 
Indirect support for political 
parties with nationalist or 
anti-reform platforms. 
Emphasis on institution-
building at the common state 
level undermines 
socialization and institution-
building processes at the 
entity level. 
Exclusion of isolated entity 
entrenches authoritarian 
leadership structures and 
illegal sectors of the 
economy, accentuating 
‘failing state’ characteristics. 
Danger of conflict escalation 
up to the point of civil war. 
Socialization of the isolated 
entity precluded. 
Possible association of the 
isolated entity with another 
external power. 
Proliferation of micro-states 
and potential tax-havens.  
Risk of destabilization of the 
region.  
Domino effect on 
secessionist movements in 
other regions of the world.  
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Let us now analyse the three conditionality-socialization models in greater 
detail. In the first model, the EU openly declares its preference for a common state 
solution and directs its conditionality and socialization efforts towards achieving that 
result. It extends its rewards to the common state only, and actively supports the 
creation of common institutions and policy coordination mechanisms at the common 
state level. The intended objectives of this policy are suppression of the secessionist 
drive, recognition of just one legal subject under international law, and gradual 
conflict transformation. Local players begin to see the benefits of staying together 
through having the opportunity to be included in a variety of EU initiatives, ranging 
from the Wider Europe Initiative through the EU accession process to full 
membership, with the promise of substantive integration into different EU common 
policies even without formal membership. Inclusion in the Stabilization and 
Association Process with the promise of full EU membership is also to be found on 
this continuum of possible forms of integration with the EU.  
Model I envisages the use of strong conditionality, and even direct mediation, 
by the EU, to induce the two sides in the conflict to agree to a common state in the 
short term. Through its policies of conditionality and mediation, the EU alters the 
strategic calculations of the players in the conflict and thus facilitates a conflict 
settlement. A far more thorough process of change, through socialization, is then 
encouraged, which helps foster conflict transformation and resolution. Conditionality 
and socialization complement each other in this model, as do the framework and 
active-player dimensions of the EU itself. 
This model has received overwhelming support among EU members for 
dealing with the present secessionist conflicts on the European periphery. This 
approach can, however, deviate from its stated goal in the course of its 
implementation, producing adverse effects. One unintended consequence can be the 
creation of a superficial layer of common institutions and policy coordination 
mechanisms, which would exist for the purpose of satisfying the EU requirements but 
would not generate sufficient domestic support to make them effective or even 
functional.41 The EU’s insistence on and financial support for institution-building at 
the common state level may generate resentment at the sub-state institutional level 
and this, in turn, may undermine its attempt to nurture genuine support for the 
common state formula. A more serious setback could be the development of 
secessionist ideas in the main entity too, as a reaction to the need to consult and reach 
consensus with the secessionist entity on every issue that becomes a matter of 
common concern. The main entity may then lose interest in preserving a complex 
federal constitutional system, favouring instead the dissolution of the common state 
institutions and focusing wholly on EU membership or association as an independent 
state.  
A second conditionality-socialization model available to the EU is to favour 
one of the entities openly, depending on: (1) the democratic credentials of its regime; 
(2) the reformist credentials of its government; and (3) the ‘reasonableness’ of its 
leadership. The EU offers full support to the entity that comes closer to espousing the 
EU values of democratic governance and is committed to reforming its domestic 
structures in line with the EU standards of democracy, market economy and rule of 
                                               
41 For similar institutional anomalies in Central and Eastern Europe, created in response to EU pre-
accession demands, see Frank Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International 
Organizations on Central and Eastern European States – Conceptual and Theoretical Issues”, in R. 
Linden (ed.), Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East 
European States (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2002), pp. 19-20. 
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law. The model seeks to isolate the entity that has an undemocratic regime or 
obstructionist leadership. If this is the main entity, the EU may consider the use of 
sanctions against it, and even the recognition of the secessionist entity, as last resort 
and when other means of putting pressure on the authoritarian leadership of the 
principal entity have been exhausted. If the undemocratic regime is the secessionist 
entity, the EU clearly communicates its unwillingness to grant recognition and applies 
all possible sanctions against it, including travel bans, economic pressure, etc. 
While the EU is putting pressure on the ‘unreasonable’ entity, it is actively 
engaging the preferred entity and extends its financial and institutional resources to it. 
The EU demands the standards of democracy, market economy and rule of law from 
the favoured conflict party and launches the process of socializing its political 
leadership and society at large. By facilitating the democratization and economic 
modernization of the preferred entity, and by promising future inclusion in EU 
structures or neighbourhood initiatives, the EU deliberately helps increase the 
attractiveness of that entity vis-à-vis the isolated one. The objective here is to put 
indirect pressure on the citizens of the isolated entity so as to provoke either a policy 
shift or a regime change.  
This model requires the EU to begin by adopting a pro-active approach to 
transforming the conflict configuration, thereby improving the chances for a 
subsequent conflict settlement. The negotiation of a common state agreement is 
postponed until a policy or regime change has effectively taken place in the isolated 
entity and its leadership is prepared to revisit earlier common state solutions. The 
model also calls for the EU to be flexible enough to reformulate its objectives and 
offer additional incentives to the parties in order to stimulate their reintegration as one 
state at a later stage. The EU may have to consider improving the incentive package 
offered to the common state as a whole in order to induce the preferred entity to 
accept reunification too. The risk here is that the preferred entity itself may abandon 
its attempts to seek a solution because of the benefits extended to it earlier in terms of 
EU integration/association.  
Another disadvantage of this strategy is the danger that its effect on the 
isolated entity might be quite the opposite from what was intended. Exclusion might 
radicalize the isolated entity rather than Europeanize it, by entrenching its leadership, 
favouring authoritarianism and criminalization, and even accentuating its ‘failing 
regime’ characteristics. The worst-case scenario would be the escalation of the 
conflict between the two parties to the point of civil war. EU rewards offered to the 
preferred entity may be viewed in the isolated one as a threat, and this may trigger a 
negative reaction, perhaps even including a military response.  
Furthermore, by relying on coercive mechanisms, the EU misses the 
opportunity to socialize the isolated entity. And if the overlap between EU norms and 
domestic practices is very slight, this could push the isolated entity to seek an 
association with or protection from another external power willing to offer it more 
favourable conditions. If such a scenario develops, the EU could find itself indirectly 
involved in a power struggle with other external players – such as Russia, for 
instance, which has its own magnetism vis-à-vis some parts of the former Soviet 
Union and can provide benefits in its turn, such as citizenship or energy resources. If 
this model is to have the desired effect, the EU needs a partnership and an agreement 
with other external players who have vested interests in the conflict region. 
A third conditionality-socialization model for the EU would be to indicate that 
it will (reluctantly) accept secession on condition that there is a peaceful, mutually 
agreed and democratic separation. It puts pressure on both parties to accept these 
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conditions. It makes it clear that, for further integration/association with the EU, each 
must meet the Copenhagen criteria for democracy, market economy and the rule of 
law. In this case, conditionality is uncoupled from the quest for comprehensive 
common state solutions and is targeted instead on domestic reforms in the areas of 
democratization, economic development and the harmonization of laws. And since the 
normative appeal of EU standards is very strong for countries on the European 
periphery, the EU’s insistence that these standards be upheld will meet with less 
resistance. As a result, socialization efforts may be expected to be more successful, 
and may reinforce the EU’s attempts to put in place sustainable structures of good 
governance in neighbouring states. As regards contractual relations with the EU, one 
variant is to treat both states equally, as the EU did in accepting Czechoslovakia’s 
‘velvet divorce’ and including both republics in its accession framework.42 Another 
variant is to include the bigger entity fully in one of the EU’s external relations 
initiatives (accession process, stabilization and association process, Wider Europe 
policy) and to develop a special relationship with the smaller entity, if full 
membership for it is ruled out. The EU can offer the micro-states advanced 
association, not least to prevent some of the unforeseeable effects of their 
proliferation.  
There is a sub-variant of this model in which the EU tries to normalize its 
relations with the de facto secessionist state without engaging in diplomatic 
recognition or offering formal integration into EU frameworks. In theory, the EU can 
be a foreign policy player without necessarily involving its framework in its 
relationship with third countries. Such normalization would initially take place at the 
level of trade, as with Taiwan. Other options include giving strong security guarantees 
to both sides in a negotiation process, or supporting democratization processes in 
unrecognized states.  
It could be argued that the ‘Europeanization’ of European de facto states by 
engaging them in active socialization processes will have positive effects on future 
negotiations. The creation of institutional ties (whether formal or even informal) 
between these states and European framework organizations such as the Council of 
Europe or NATO may affect the way in which domestic players define their interests 
and identities. Such a process of transforming the local norms and values that prevail 
in both the secessionist entity and the rump state may then lead to the gradual 
convergence of the parties, paving the way for more successful negotiations on 
political status.  
Normalizing trade relations with de facto states, granting them security 
guarantees and pursuing an active policy of Europeanizing them all contribute a 
certain amount of support to the state-building endeavours of secessionist entities. By 
easing political tensions and bringing the parties together in various cooperative 
frameworks, this support may facilitate the search for a settlement within a single-
state solution at a later stage.  
In practice, however, it is difficult to give these kinds of support to de facto 
states as the latter’s international status remains in limbo. Such support would require 
the consent of the internationally recognized authorities from which the de facto states 
                                               
42 In the case of Czechoslovakia’s ‘velvet divorce’ at the end of 1992, there was no doubt about the 
legitimacy of the two new states that emerged from the agreed dissolution of a sovereign state. The 
institution of sovereignty is based on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, and the 
peaceful dissolution of an existing state is primarily an internal affair. This does not preclude the 
possibility that the European Union might in the future be fully entitled to lay down its own conditions 
if new states emerging from a ‘velvet divorce’ were to apply for closer integration with the EU. 
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have seceded. These governments (or the political opposition in these countries) may 
perceive such democracy-building and Europeanization policies as a form of gradual 
recognition by the international community, rather than as policies to integrate them 
into a common European legal space in order to facilitate a settlement. This does not 
mean that these policies would be impossible to implement, particularly if linked to 
negotiations on political status. One also has to take into account the fact that 
secessionist leaderships commonly declare themselves in favour of the 
Europeanization of their states and societies, and that substantial economic interests 
are at stake. International NGOs, moreover, are already active in all de facto states, 
working on democracy and other state-building programmes. In principle, EU 
structures are capable of mobilizing sufficient institutional and other resources to 
make such policies successful.  
There is thus a variety of options, whose application depends on the situation 
on the ground. If, for instance, a common state solution backed by the EU (in line 
with the first option) proves unsuccessful in the sense that its unintended effects 
outweigh the intended ones, a switch to a separation scenario (in line with the third 
option) should not be ruled out. Likewise, if sanctions and pressure on the smaller 
entity succeed in changing the minds of its leadership, renewed interest in a common 
state solution, and EU support for it, could produce a sustainable outcome. But in 
order to conduct such a dynamic foreign policy, the EU needs to strengthen its 
performance as an active player.  The intended and unintended effects of the strategies 
discussed above are also affected by the EU’s capacity to take action in foreign 
affairs. 
 
1.4 The wider set of framework organizations and external powers 
 
So far, the focus has been on Europeanization, and the potential role of the European 
Union in various conflicts at the periphery of the EU. But as the distance between the 
conflict and the core of Europe increases, the EU’s leverage decreases and the 
relevance of framework organizations and external players, in particular the US and 
Russia, increases. In what follows we will first focus on the potential of framework 
organizations in the field of conflict settlement and conflict resolution, and then 
highlight the role and interests of external actors. 
Europeanization is not exclusively EU-ization, although this is how it has 
predominantly been taking place with and within the accession countries. In addition 
to the EU, the CoE, the OSCE and NATO are currently institutionalizing specific 
norms in specific fields of specialization, ranging from constitutive norms for the 
international community, such as democracy and transparency, to more specific 
norms, such as civilian control over the military.43 These institutions use a variety of 
strategies in order to socialize the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Some use 
inclusive strategies aimed at socializing them from within. All the states that emerged 
from the dissolution of the Soviet Union were readily accepted as members of the 
OSCE, and the organization then began to ‘teach’ them new rules of behaviour. The 
new members had to accept an obligation to internalize the new norms. Other 
institutions, such as the EU, are following an exclusive strategy: the organization 
explains its constitutive norms, which applicant members are requested to meet before 
they are allowed to join.  
                                               
43 On the distinction between constitutive and specific norms, and between inclusive and exclusive 
socializing strategies, see ibid. pp. 7 ff.  
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It is striking that the EU is the only organization that has strictly followed an 
exclusive strategy, without combining it with an inclusive one: NATO, for instance, 
has set up the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, in which the norms to be met are far 
easier to comply with than those required for NATO membership. The CoE has 
followed an intermediate strategy: some norms have to be met before accession, and 
compliance with a new set of norms is then required upon accession, and is 
subsequently monitored from within. This strategy facilitated the integration of the 
South Caucasus states, for instance, and their socialization. 
The multilateral organizations relevant to our case-studies are the IMF, IBRD 
and EBRD in the economic sphere, the Council of Europe and the OSCE in the 
political, democratization and legislative spheres, NATO in the realm of security and 
the UN as mediator and peacekeeper. In practice there is a normative convergence and 
division of labour between the multilateral organizations. There are also some 
operational overlaps, such as between the Council of Europe and OSCE in the area of 
democratization, and between the UN and OSCE in conflict mediation. At present, the 
role of the multilateral framework organizations in conflicts with non-recognized 
secessionist entities is limited, as they are largely prevented from intervening by the 
major powers which are withholding recognition. The only exception is where the UN 
or OSCE is mandated to mediate or keep the peace, or to monitor human rights in 
non-recognized states.  
What concerns us here are the policies of these players and organizations, and 
how they work with (or at cross-purposes with) each other and the EU. Naturally, the 
state players come first, as between them they determine the policies of the 
framework organizations. Whether the OSCE works usefully depends on the EU, 
Russia and the US combined. The Council of Europe depends essentially on the EU, 
but Russia also has a significant voice. How easy or otherwise it is to gear these and 
the other relevant multilateral organizations up to achieve important tasks in conflict 
management, and particularly to stabilize conflict settlements, depends on how 
compatible the objectives of these three major players are. The problem is not just the 
unwieldy decision-making procedures of consensus-bound councils of ministers with 
very large numbers of seats around the table. Problems also lie in the compatibility of 
the overall strategies of the Big Three (seeing that the EU is itself reasonably unified 
on Balkan issues), and the bottom-line objectives that each may have for the different 
conflicts.  
Meanwhile, the whole range of multilateral organizations have been put to 
work together, with the UN, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, IMF and IBRD 
becoming a consortium of the international community. These are cases in which the 
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions are often perceived by states as being one 
huge enterprise. Here the process of Europeanization may be broadly viewed as 
embracing the work of all these framework organizations, with the strategic input of 
the US. The economic policies stipulated as conditions for receiving IMF and IBRD 
aid, sometimes called the Washington consensus, are readily supported by the EU in 
its conditionality.  
These problems are virtually non-existent now in the Balkans and Cyprus, 
because the EU-ization process dominates. There the EU is becoming both lead player 
and framework organization. As prospects for EU accession become closer and more 
vivid politically for the region as a whole, these trends seem set to continue, still 
leaving open the possibility that the EU may use the other framework organizations 
more or less as supporting agents. But for Moldova and the Caucasus, compatibility 
of objectives is still an issue, with official diplomacy often extremely opaque. In the 
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light of the new paradigms for international relations emerging post-11 September 
and post-Saddam Hussein, we shall consider in what ways the major powers may be 
inclined to work together (or not) in Moldova and the Caucasus, including options for 
coalitions or troika alliances. 
The role of external powers may be explored in considering the possible 
meanings of Pax Americana and Russification. The foreign and security policies of 
the US have oscillated hugely over the last century. At one extreme has been the 
Wilsonian approach, which led to the establishment of principled multilateral 
organizations, initially after the First World War and again, more forcefully, after the 
Second World War. This is the US that comes closest to the present European 
position. At the other extreme is the US that is at times inclined towards a hegemonic 
and unilateralist approach to international relations, favouring the use of force as a 
means of conflict settlement. The present Bush administration, in the aftermath of 11 
September, is probably a relatively extreme case of the latter tendency. However, 
when it comes to the theatres of operation in the Balkans and the South Caucasus that 
are our immediate concern, the US-European cleavage is far less in evidence.44  
In Moldova and the South Caucasus, Russia appears to be driven mostly by 
sphere-of-interest and geopolitical control motives, following normative political 
principles that show little commonality with those of the EU. This severe remark 
seems justified by the fact that Russia is politically and militarily protecting the 
secessionist regimes in the region without making any noticeable effort to reform 
them in line with generally accepted democratic norms. But Russia’s evolution is 
capable of taking either of two directions: a deepening Europeanization coupled with 
growing respect for European norms, including in its attitude towards secessionist 
regimes, or a more assertive pursuit of its national interests in a realpolitik sense, with 
little regard for asserting common norms with the EU. The pendulum still seems to be 
swinging between these different approaches. 
Finally, we must consider to what extent the Council of Europe and the OSCE 
could in future provide additional guarantees of impartial arbitration in ethnic 
conflicts within federations. The Council of Europe currently plays an important role 
in the Europeanization process by applying the legally binding European Convention 
on Human Rights through the European Court of Human Rights. The Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities outlines the principles that states 
should respect in this field, while the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages protects these languages. The Council of Europe could be involved in 
judicial ways of mediating internal conflicts in new federations.45 The existing 
experience of some federated entities (such as Flanders within UNESCO) – who 
combine participation in federal decision-making on ‘national’ positions to be 
                                               
44 On the contrary, in the Balkans the US and EU have been able to work in close coordination, with 
complementarity of roles, as well as provide joint support for the work of the multilateral 
organizations. An instance of complementarity was, for example, the US-led military intervention in 
the 1990s in Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by political settlements that were virtually dictated by the 
US and supported by the EU, and then the ongoing phase of Europeanizing transformation of the 
former conflict zones. At this stage the US gradually withdraws, leaving the field open for EU-ization.  
45 A Constitutional Court of the Federation of the Bosnian type could be envisaged, in which a certain 
number (perhaps even the majority) of judges would be appointed by the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights (which is linked to the Council of Europe). Such a model has been included in 
the Dayton Agreements (three of the nine judges of the Bosnian Constitutional Court are appointed by 
the European Court of Human Rights). The UN proposal on Cyprus provides for such a constitutional 
court at state level.  
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defended in multilateral organizations with autonomously representing them in these 
multilateral organizations – is also relevant when designing federal alternatives to 
secession.  
In order to stabilize a post-accord situation, a reunified state may join 
cooperative ‘regional organizations’, lying between the individual states and the 
global multilateral organizations or European Union structures, which can therefore 
be an additional level in the third tier. Such regional structures may be technical 
(transport and energy linkages, for example), but may also connect with larger 
political ideas about transforming former conflict situations through deepening 
regional interdependence. Such regional organizations, which would permit the 
representation of sub-state entities, will make possible the exercise of a limited right 
to national self-determination at the external level, particularly the right to external 
representation of federated entities, within the limits of their constitutional powers. A 
regional integration framework that recognizes these powers may thus enforce 
patterns of interdependence between the two levels of federal governance, and link 
them with intergovernmental – and possibly even supranational – levels of 
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